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Abstract. Cryptographic protocols are commonly designed and their
security proven under the assumption that the protocol parties have
access to perfect (uniform) randomness. Physical randomness sources
deployed in practical implementations of these protocols often fall short in
meeting this assumption, but instead provide only a steady stream of bits
with certain high entropy. Trying to ground cryptographic protocols on
such imperfect, weaker sources of randomness has thus far mostly given
rise to a multitude of impossibility results, including the impossibility
to construct provably secure encryption, commitments, secret sharing,
and zero-knowledge proofs based solely on a weak source. More generally,
indistinguishability-based properties break down for such weak sources.
In this paper, we show that the loss of security induced by using a
weak source can be meaningfully quantified if the source is bounded, e.g.,
for the well-studied Santha-Vazirani (SV) sources. The quantification
relies on a novel relaxation of indistinguishability by a quantitative
parameter. We call the resulting notion differential indistinguishability
in order to reflect its structural similarity to differential privacy. More
concretely, we prove that indistinguishability with uniform randomness
implies differential indistinguishability with weak randomness. We show
that if the amount of weak randomness is limited (e.g., by using it only
to seed a PRG), all cryptographic primitives and protocols still achieve
differential indistinguishability.
Keywords: indistinguishability, randomness, weak sources, differential privacy, pseu-
dorandom generators, Santha-Vazirani sources
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are commonly designed and their security proven under
the assumption that the protocol parties have access to perfect, i.e., uniform,
randomness. Actual physical randomness sources that cryptographic implementa-
tions rely on, however, rarely meet this assumption: instead of providing uniform
randomness, they provide only a stream of bits with a certain high amount of
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entropy. Moreover, these so-called weak sources, such as the Santha-Vazirani
(SV) sources [33], are often non-extractable [15, 33], i.e., it is computationally
infeasible to extract more than a super-logarithmic amount of (almost) uniform
randomness from them.
There have been several attempts to bridge this gap, i.e., to ground the
security guarantees of cryptographic systems on such weak sources. As soon as
indistinguishability-based secrecy properties are being desired, however, this line
of research has mostly given rise to a multitude of impossibility results [7, 15, 30],
only complemented by a few constructive results if additional assumptions are
being imposed. For instance, encryption can be realized using weak sources, if
one imposes strong assumptions on the entropy of encrypted messages [5], or if
the weak source is restricted to the key generation algorithm and a perfect source
is available for the actual encryption algorithm [18]. The plurality of impossibility
results in this area, as well as the absence of comprehensive constructive results,
indicates that traditional indistinguishability-based secrecy notions fall short in
capturing the impact of weak randomness on cryptography. This constitutes an
unsatisfactory situation, with several open questions looking for an answer:
– Is it possible to quantify the secrecy loss of cryptographic operations and
primitives, if a weak source (such as an SV source) is being used?
– Imagine that today a cryptographic protocol (e.g., an e-voting system) is
executed and tomorrow it turns out that the employed randomness was weak.
Given that there are strong impossibility results [7, 15, 30] for indistinguisha-
bility, is all lost or can we still give quantitative guarantees about the secrecy
of the system?
– Given that these quantitative guarantees will necessarily be weaker than
traditional cryptographic guarantees, under which assumptions do they still
provide reasonable practical security guarantees?
In this paper we address all of these questions.
1.1 Our Contributions
Relaxing Indistinguishability to Quantify the Secrecy Loss. We derive
quantitative guarantees for all indistinguishability-based cryptographic construc-
tions that are used with arbitrary weak sources that are additionally bounded in
the following sense: in addition to imposing an upper bound on the probability
of each individual bitstring (i.e., requiring a sufficiently high min-entropy), one
additionally imposes a lower bound on these probabilities. These bounded weak
sources include SV sources [33] and resemble balanced sources [24].
To quantify the secrecy loss that weak randomness imposes on cryptog-
raphy, we define differential indistinguishability, a quantitative relaxation of
cryptographic indistinguishability in the spirit of differential privacy [19, 31]
and pseudodensity [32]. The necessity of a new, relaxed notion arises from the
impossibility result of Dodis et al. [15] who showed that whenever only weak
sources of randomness are available, traditional indistinguishability is provably
impossible for cryptographic primitives that have a secrecy requirement, e.g.,
encryption, commitments, and zero-knowledge proofs. More concretely, one can-
not ensure that the advantage in distinguishing two challenger machines X0
and X1 is negligible for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. However,
it might still be the case that no adversary has a non-negligible advantage in
performing a practical attack that breaks the security entirely, e.g., by reaching
a state in which it is certain whether it interacts with X0 or X1. The notion of
differential indistinguishability consequently aims at quantifying the resulting
loss of secrecy without overestimating the adversary’s power to break the scheme
entirely: Two games, i.e., interactions with two machines X0 and X1, are (ε, δ)-
differentially indistinguishable if for all interactive distinguisher machines A, the
output probabilities for all outputs x are related by
Pr [〈A|X0〉 = x] ≤ 2ε · Pr [〈A|X1〉 = x] + δ,
where x is a possible output of A.1 Here ε ≥ 0 is a reasonably small constant or a
decreasing function such as 1/p(·) for a polynomial p. We allow only a negligible
function for δ, which corresponds to a negligible probability to break the security
of the scheme entirely. Differential indistinguishability thus offers quantitative
parameters to reason about the loss of secrecy incurred by the use of imperfect
randomness.
Guarantees for Cryptographic Primitives Using Weak Sources. As our
main contribution we show that traditional indistinguishability (given a uniform
randomness source) suffices to guarantee differential indistinguishability if the
uniform source is replaced by an arbitrary bounded weak source. This result
immediately entails meaningful quantitative lower security bounds in cases where
indistinguishability-based definitions are provably impossible to achieve [15].
In particular, our methodology can be applied in hindsight and produces
meaningful quantitative guarantees for all cryptographic primitives and protocols,
provided that the amount of used imperfect randomness is bounded; there is
no need for new cryptographic constructions for any of the existing primitives
whose security is defined and proven by means of indistinguishability, including
simulator-based notions. Moreover, we show that if the bounded weak randomness
is used only to seed a secure PRG, differential indistinguishability suffers only
a negligible quantitative (additional) security loss under composition – just as
traditional indistinguishability.
Intuitively, is not surprising that the provided secrecy does not degrade
substantially if the quality of the randomness degrades within certain small
bounds, because otherwise virtually all practical implementations of cryptography
would be insecure due to the inherent imperfection of physical sources. Our work
confirms this intuition and provides a framework to analyze the resulting loss of
secrecy quantitatively.
1 In contrast to differential privacy and pseudodensity, we use 2 instead of e as a base
for the exponential function, because the base 2 fits standard definitions of entropy
better.
Technically, Theorem 1 states that the interactions with two machines X0 and
X1 are differentially indistinguishable for bounded weak distributions if they are
indistinguishable for the uniform distribution. These machines X0 and X1 can then
be instantiated by arbitrary challenger machines to immediately derive results for
cryptographic notions. Theorem 1 comprises arbitrary classes of adversaries and
thus covers information-theoretical and computational indistinguishability. To
derive quantitative guarantees, the theorem only imposes the requirement that
the entropy of the bounded weak randomness used by the primitive or protocol
is bounded in terms of the security parameter. Thus all existing primitives that
use a bounded amount of randomness can immediately be analyzed and their
secrecy loss quantified by an additional multiplicative factor that only depends
on the quality of the random source.
Connection to Differential Privacy.We analyze the relation between differen-
tial indistinguishability and the well-studied notion of differential privacy [19,31],
especially in terms of composition. Similar to the privacy loss in differential
privacy when the privacy of several users is analyzed, differential indistinguisha-
bility suffers from a commensurate loss of entropy, which consequently leads to a
secrecy loss in cases where several users use weak, potentially even dependent
randomness. This relation is of particular interest in scenarios in which the users
are not aware of using imperfect randomness and thus fail to deploy existing
methods [12,25,27] to improve their randomness using multiple sources.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We recall impor-
tant concepts and introduce our notation in Section 2. We define differential
indistinguishability and present our main results in Section 3. We then demon-
strate the utility of differential indistinguishability to public-key encryption and
study composability of differentially indistinguishable primitives in Section 4.
We interpret and analyze differential indistinguishability in Section 5, including
a comparison between differential indistinguishability with differential privacy.
Finally, we discuss related work in Section 6 and possible future directions in
Section 7. To improve readability, we have shifted several proofs to Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We denote sampling an element r from a distributionD by r ← D. The probability
of the event F (r), where r is sampled from the distribution D, is denoted by
Pr [F (r) | r ← D] or more compactly by Pr [F (D)]. To keep the notation simple,
we write fk for the value of a function f(·) applied to k, where k is typically the
security parameter. We drop the explicit dependence of parameters and security
bounds (α, β, ε, γ) on k whenever it is clear from the context. We denote by
{Dk}k∈N a family of distributions such that for each k ∈ N the distribution Dk
samples elements from {0, 1}k. In particular, {Uk}k∈N is the family of uniform
distributions, where Uk is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}k.
Throughout the paper we consider (possibly interactive) Turing machines X
that always have implicitly access to a random tape with an infinite sequence of
uniformly distributed random bits, even if the machines get an additional input
drawn from some random source. Unless we mention that they run in probabilistic
polynomial time (ppt) in the length of their first input, those machines are not
bounded. The distribution on the outputs of X when run on input x is denoted by
X(x). Similarly, we write 〈X(x)|Y(y)〉 to denote the distribution on the output of
the machine X on input x in an interaction with the machine Y on input y. We
write log := log2 for the logarithm to base 2.
Randomness Sources. In addition to the commonly used min-entropy, we
make use of a symmetrically defined counterpart, coined max-entropy by Hait-
ner et. al. [24]: whereas min-entropy bounds the maximum likelihood event,
max-entropy bounds the minimum likelihood event (and consequently requires
probability distributions with full support).2
Definition 1. Let D be a distribution over the set S. The min-entropy of D
is Hmin(D) ··= minx∈S(− log Pr[D = x]); the max-entropy of D is Hmax(D) ··=
maxx∈S(− log Pr[D = x]).
These entropy measures allow us to define bounded weak sources, which must
additionally provide a certain amount of max-entropy in comparison to weak
sources.
Definition 2. A family of distributions {Dn}n∈N, each over the set {0, 1}n of
bitstrings of length n, is a (α, β)-bounded weak source, if every Dn satisfies the
following entropy requirements:
(i) Dn has min-entropy at least n− α, and
(ii) Dn has max-entropy at most n+ β.
If a family of distributions {Dn}n∈N satisfies only requirement (i), but not re-
quirement (ii), we call it an α-weak source (or a min-entropy source) instead.
The following generalization of Santha-Vazirani (SV) sources [33] to block
sources [11,15] is a special case of (α, β)-bounded weak sources. Block sources are
well-suited to describe both physical random sources as well as certain random
sources that have been “tampered with” by an adversary [1].
Definition 3 (SV Block Source). A tuple of distributions D = (D1, . . . , Dt),
each over the set {0, 1}n of bitstrings of length n, is (n, γ)-Santha-Vazirani (SV)
(for 0 < γ < 1) if for all 0 ≤ i ≤ t and for all x1, . . . , xi ∈ {0, 1}n,
(1− γ) · 2−n ≤ Pr [Di = xi ∣∣ x1 ← D1, . . . , xi−1 ← Di−1] ≤ (1 + γ) · 2−n.
The original SV sources are a special case of Definition 3 that arises for n = 1.
Every (n, γ)-SV block source over {0, 1}tn is an (α, β)-bounded weak source
where α = t · log(1 + γ) and β = −t · log(1− γ).
Remark 1. Our complete analysis is also possible for sources that are only sta-
tistically close to (α, β)-bounded weak sources such as sources in [24] that have
a limited number of outliers. We refer to Appendix D for both definitions and
results for such sources.
2 This notion of max-entropy is not to be confused with Hartley entropy, which is also
sometimes called max-entropy.
3 Differential Indistinguishability
In this section we present our main results, which can be applied to a variety of
cryptographic notions. Traditional cryptography defines two machines X0 and X1
to be indistinguishable for a certain class of distinguishers A if no distinguisher
A ∈ A in this class is able to notice a difference between an interaction with
X0 and an interaction with X1. Formally, the concept of “noticing a difference”
is captured by requiring that any possible view of a distinguisher is (almost)
equally likely for both X0 and X1, i.e., the difference between the probability that
A outputs any given view in the interaction with X0 and the probability that A
outputs the same view in the interaction with X1 is negligible. We consider a
variant of indistinguishability that allows these probabilities to be also related by
a multiplicative factor 2ε > 1, similar to the concept of mutual pseudodensity [32]
and differential privacy [19,31].
Definition 4 (Differential Indistinguishability). Two probabilistic machines
X0 and X1 are (ε,δ)-differentially indistinguishable for a distribution {D`}`∈N
over {0, 1}` for a positive polynomial ` and a class A of adversaries (probabilistic
machines) if for all A ∈ A, for all sufficiently large k, for all possible outputs x
of A, and for all b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr
[〈
A(1k)
∣∣Xb(1k, D`)〉 = x] ≤ 2ε Pr [〈A(1k)∣∣X1−b(1k, D`)〉 = x]+ δk.
This definition allows to express many of the traditional cryptographic indistin-
guishability notions [22,28]. We discuss the impact of the multiplicative factor,
that can (and must) be interpreted carefully, in Section 5. For the traditional
case of ε = 0 we speak of δ-indistinguishability. The definition covers interactive
and non-interactive notions, as well as simulation-based notions. For perfect
(information-theoretic) indistinguishability, the class of adversaries is the class
A∞ of all probabilistic (possibly unbounded) machines and we have δ = 0.3
Statistical indistinguishability can be expressed with the same class of adversaries
for δ > 0. Cryptographic (computational) indistinguishability can be achieved
with the class Appt of ppt machines with δ being a negligible function.4
3.1 Main Result
Traditional indistinguishability for uniform randomness directly implies differen-
tial indistinguishability for (α, β)-bounded weak sources. This is captured by the
following theorem. It allows us to easily give guarantees for cryptographic primi-
tives whenever their security notions can be expressed in terms of Definition 4.
Theorem 1. If two probabilistic machines X0 and X1 are δ-indistinguishable for
a class of probabilistic machines A and the family of uniform sources {Un}n∈N
over {0, 1}n, then X0 and X1 are also (α+β, 2α ·δ)-differentially indistinguishable
for A and any (α, β)-bounded weak source over {0, 1}n.
3 We additionally drop the formulation “for sufficiently large k” in the case of
information-theoretic security.
4 Note that this is equivalent to requiring a negligible function for every adversary [4].
Proof. We show the theorem by first proving a technical lemma about bounded
weak distributions: Even though an (α, β)-bounded weak distribution is not
negligibly close to a uniform distribution, the parameters α and β give a bound
on the discrepancy between the uniform distribution and the bounded weak
distribution.
Lemma 1. Let {Dn}n∈N be an (α, β)-bounded weak source over {0, 1}n and
let {Un}n∈N be a family of uniform sources over {0, 1}n. For all probabilistic
machines A, for all k ∈ N and for all possible outputs x of A,
Pr
[
A(1k, Dn) = x
] ≤ 2α Pr [A(1k, Un) = x] (a)
and Pr
[
A(1k, Un) = x
] ≤ 2β Pr [A(1k, Dn) = x] . (b)
Proof. Let {Dn}n∈N be an (α, β)-bounded weak distribution over {0, 1}n. By
Definition 2, Dn has min-entropy at least n− α and max-entropy at most n+ β.
We start with (a). For all values r0 ∈ {0, 1}n,
log
(
Pr [Dn = r0]
Pr [Un = r0]
)
= log (Pr [Dn = r0])− log
(
2−n
)
≤ − min
y∈{0,1}n
(− log (Pr [Dn = y]))− log
(
2−n
)
≤ − (n− α) + n = α.
Using this inequality we can show (a) as follows. For all possible outputs x of A,
Pr
[
A(1k, Dn) = x
]
=
∑
r0∈{0,1}n
Pr
[
A(1k, r0) = x
]
Pr [Dn = r0]
≤
∑
r0∈{0,1}n
Pr
[
A(1k, r0) = x
] · 2α · Pr [Un = r0]
≤ 2α Pr [A(1k, Un) = x] .
This shows (a). For (b), note that for all values r0 ∈ {0, 1}n, the probability
Pr [Dn = r0] is strictly larger than zero because β <∞. For all values r0 ∈ {0, 1}n,
log
(
Pr [Un = r0]
Pr [Dn = r0]
)
= log
(
2−n
)− log (Pr [Dn = r0])
≤ log (2−n)+ max
y∈{0,1}n
(− log (Pr [Dn = y]))
≤ −n+ (n+ β) = β.
Using this equation we can show (b) as follows. For all possible outputs x of A,
Pr
[
A(1k, Un) = x
]
=
∑
r0∈{0,1}n
Pr
[
A(1k, r0) = x
]
Pr [Un = r0]
≤
∑
r0∈{0,1}n
Pr
[
A(1k, r0) = x
] · 2β · Pr [Dn = r0]
≤ 2β Pr [A(1k, Dn) = x] .
This completes the proof of Lemma 1. uunionsq
Now we use the lemma to prove our main theorem. Let {Dn}n∈N be an (α, β)-
bounded weak source, and {Un}n∈N be the uniform source, both over {0, 1}n.
Furthermore, let X0, X1 be probabilistic (not necessarily polynomially bounded)
machines, and let A ∈ A be an adversary machine such that for a function δ,
Pr
[〈
A(1k)
∣∣X0(1k, Un)〉 = x] ≤ Pr [〈A(1k)∣∣X1(1k, Un)〉 = x]+ δ.
Using Lemma 1, we show that A behaves similarly on Dn, as otherwise a ma-
chine that simulates
〈
A(1k)
∣∣X0(1k, r)〉 (or 〈A(1k)∣∣X1(1k, r)〉) could distinguish
{Dn}n∈N and {Un}n∈N.
Pr
[〈
A(1k)
∣∣X0(1k, Dn)〉 = x] ≤ 2α Pr [〈A(1k)∣∣X0(1k, Un)〉 = x] (1)
≤ 2α Pr [〈A(1k)∣∣X1(1k, Un)〉 = x]+ 2α · δ (2)
≤ 2α+β Pr [〈A(1k)∣∣X1(1k, Dn)〉 = x]+ 2α · δ (3)
Here, inequalities (1) and (3) follow from inequalities (a) and (b) in Lemma 1,
respectively. The remaining inequality (2) holds by assumption. uunionsq
Recall that every (n, γ)-SV block source over {0, 1}tn (Definition 3) is an (α, β)-
bounded weak source where α = t · log(1 + γ) and β = −t · log(1 − γ). With
γ < 1/2, it holds that β ≤ 2tγ and α ≤ 2tγ. Thus, we can instantiate Theorem 1
for SV block sources as follows:
Corollary 1. If two probabilistic machines X0 and X1 are δ-indistinguishable for
a class of probabilistic machines A and the family of uniform sources {Unt}nt∈N
over {0, 1}nt, then X0 and X1 are also (ε, 2εδ)-differentially indistinguishable for
A and any family of (n, γ)-SV block sources {Dnt}nt∈N over {0, 1}tn with γ ≤ 12 ,
where ε = γ · 4t.
Remark 2. Lemma 1 can also be interesting for sources with unbounded max-
entropy. In this case, β is infinitely large and consequently, inequality (b) does
not yield interesting guarantees anymore. However, for restricting undesirable
events that are not based on indistinguishability, inequality (a) suffices, which
is in line with the results of Dodis and Yu [18]. We refer to Appendix B for a
discussion.
3.2 Computational Differential Indistinguishability Guarantees
In the computational setting where adversaries are ppt machines, we can achieve
a stronger result: If we rely on a pseudorandom generator (PRG), we can expand
a short seed from a randomness source to polynomially many bits of pseudoran-
domness. This well-known property is especially interesting here, as it allows us
to apply Theorem 1 in a much broader form: Virtually every classically secure
protocol is differentially secure when only a short random seed has been drawn
from a bounded weak source and then expanded via a PRG, as this puts a limit
on the entropy loss imposed by the actual bounded weak source. We formalize
this observation in the following corollary, which is central to our work.
Corollary 2. If two probabilistic machines X0 and X1 are computationally in-
distinguishable for a class of ppt machines A and uniform randomness, then X0
and X1 are also (α + β, 2α · δ)-differentially indistinguishable for A and for a
negligible function δ, if they draw their randomness from a PRG that is seeded
with a (α, β)-bounded weak source.
The corollary also gives guarantees for protocols and security proofs in which
the amount of necessary randomness can be influenced by the adversary, e.g., by
sending requests to the machine.
4 Application to Cryptography
We apply differential indistinguishability to a common secrecy definition, namely
indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks for public-key encryption.
This definition serves as example for how to instantiate the notion and how to
apply our main results to quantify the secrecy loss under imperfect randomness.
Moreover, we analyze differential indistinguishability under composition. We
obtain a general composability result for differential indistinguishability that
comes, similar to the composability of differential privacy, with a loss of secrecy.
We refer to Appendix C for a discussion about additional application examples
(commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs).
4.1 Public-Key Encryption
For PKE, standard security definitions, e.g., indistinguishability under adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) [22] can naturally be relaxed to use differential
indistinguishability instead of traditional indistinguishability.
Definition 5 ((ε, δ)-DIF-IND-CCA). A pair A = (A0,A1) of ppt oracle machines
is an IND-CCA adversary if A0 outputs two messages x0, x1 of the same length
together with a state s, A1 outputs a bit, and both A0 and A1 have access to
decryption oracles as defined below. A PKE scheme E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) has
(ε, δ)-differentially indistinguishable encryptions under adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack for a randomness source {Dn}n∈N if for all IND-CCA adversaries and for
all sufficiently large k and bitstrings z of polynomial length in k, it holds that
Pr
[
P(0)k,z = 1
]
≤ 2ε Pr
[
P(1)k,z = 1
]
+ δ, where P (i)k,z is defined as:
P(i)k,z ··=(e, d)← Gen(1k); ((x0, x1), s)← ADec(d,·)0 (1k, e, z)
c← Enc(e, xi;Dn); output ADecc(d,·)1 (1k, s, c)
Here, Decc(d, ·) denotes a decryption oracle that answers on all ciphertexts except
for c, where it returns an error symbol ⊥. The randomness used by the encryption
algorithm Enc is drawn from Dn.
Note that (0, δ)-DIF-IND-CCA security is equivalent to traditional δ-IND-CCA
security.
Encryption with Imperfect Randomness. Both the encryption algorithm
and the key generation algorithm require randomness. Dodis and Yu [18] show
that even if weak sources are used for the key generation of IND-CCA secure
encryption schemes, the security is preserved. However, this result does not
apply when imperfect randomness is used by the encryption algorithm. The next
theorem, an application of Theorem 1, quantifies the secrecy loss whenever the
encryption algorithm has only access to an (α, β)-bounded weak source.
Theorem 2. Let E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be any PKE scheme that is δ-IND-CCA
secure under the assumption that Enc consumes at most n bits of uniform random-
ness. Then E is (α+ β, 2αδ)-DIF-IND-CCA secure if Enc uses an (α, β)-bounded
weak source {Dn}n∈N instead of a uniform source.
We refer to Appendix A.1 for a proof.
Discussion. Theorem 2 enables us to provide meaningful guarantees if an
IND-CCA secure encryption scheme relies on imperfect randomness, as long as the
randomness used to encrypt the ciphertext in question is drawn from a bounded
weak source. If an encryption scheme is (ε,δ)-DIF-IND-CCA secure, the adversary
may learn that the probability that a ciphertext contains a particular message
m0 is 2ε times higher than the probability that it contains another message m1.
However, if ε is reasonably small, e.g., ε = 0.001 (and thus 2ε ≈ 1.001), both m0
and m1 are a plausible content of the ciphertext. In particular, the adversary
cannot reasonably believe or even convince a third party that m0 is the value that
has been encrypted. Moreover, the encryptor retains (a weak form of) deniability:
She could indeed have encrypted any message.
Imperfect Randomness in Both Key Generation and Encryption. Our
results also enable us to give a differential indistinguishability guarantee in the
case when both the key generation algorithm Gen and the encryption algorithm
Enc make use of a bounded weak source. If a PRG was used, seeded by a bounded
weak random source, then we can immediately apply Corollary 2 to derive a
differential indistinguishability guarantee. In contrast to the result of Dodis and
Yu that requires the encryption scheme to be simulatable as defined by [18],
which excludes, e.g., stateful schemes, we do not require any such structural
property of the scheme.5 If, for some reason, no PRG was used, one can still apply
Theorem 1, but this will naturally yield weaker guarantees, as the combined
randomness of Gen and Enc needs to be taken into account (and moreover the
security loss under composition is significant, as discussed below).
Multiple Encryptions. Theorem 2 states a guarantee only for a single en-
cryption (namely the encryption of one challenge message). However, it can be
extended to the encryption of a message vector. In particular, if a PRG is used
5 We discuss simulatability as well as the relation between our result and the result by
Dodis and Yu [18] in Section 5.2.
(and thus the amount of bounded weak randomness is limited to the seed of the
PRG), Corollary 2 yields immediately a differential indistinguishability guarantee
with ε being independent of the number of encrypted messages. If however, the
encryption algorithm Enc is run several times with (fresh) imperfect randomness,
the entropy loss of the randomness can increase linearly in the number of messages
in the vector for SV block sources, and consequently, ε increases significantly.
Other Security Definitions. Although we focus on IND-CCA security for PKE
in this section, the broad applicability of Theorem 1 allows to handle other
security definitions such as indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack
(IND-CPA) similarly.
4.2 Composability
Traditional indistinguishability with a negligible function δ and ε = 0 allows for
polynomially many compositions, because a polynomial factor for the advantage
of an adversary, which might come from from seeing multiple samples, does not
help the adversary substantially (the advantage remains negligible). This is not
true for differential indistinguishability in general, because the (non-negligible)
multiplicative factors can, under certain conditions, be accumulated as well.
For individual users we have shown that sequential composition of one or
more primitives is possible without an (additional) loss of secrecy if a PRG is
used (Corollary 2). If, however, several users within a protocol use imperfect
randomness, the secrecy can degrade. Interestingly, we can give a bound on
the loss of secrecy that is similar to the composition that occurs for differential
privacy. We formulate a general composition lemma that we can instantiate to
cope with several situations.
Lemma 2. Let A be a class of adversaries. If X0 and X1 are (ε, δ)-differentially
indistinguishable for A, and X1 and X2 are (ε′, δ′)-differentially indistinguishable
for A, then X0 and X2 are (ε′′, δ′′)-differentially indistinguishable for A where
ε′′ = ε+ ε′ and δ′′ = 2ε′δ + 2εδ′.
We refer to Appendix A.2 for a proof.
A direct application of the lemma is the above described scenario in which
multiple users (sequentially or concurrently) contribute to a protocol and use
bad randomness. In this case, the machine X1 can express an intermediate
scenario that is used in a straightforward hybrid argument, where for two users
X1 is the only hybrid. Moreover, the lemma is applicable to scenarios where an
individual user draws from a random source several times (for several primitives
or protocols) instead of using a PRG, and also to compositions of differential
indistinguishability guarantees in information-theoretical settings, where a PRG
cannot be employed in the first place.
5 Interpretation and Analysis
In this section, we analyze and interpret the security guarantees provided by
differential indistinguishability. In particular, we study the impact of a mul-
tiplication factor, and the influence of min- and max-entropy on differential
indistinguishability. Furthermore, we discuss the relation between differential
indistinguishability and differential privacy.
5.1 Impact of a Multiplicative Factor
Similar to differential privacy, differential indistinguishability adds a multiplicative
factor to the inequality used in the traditional indistinguishability notion. We
observe that a multiplicative bound may express properties that are inexpressible
by an additive bound. While every multiplicative bound of the form Pr [A] ≤
2ε Pr [B]+δ implies a purely additive bound Pr [A] ≤ Pr [B]+δ+2ε−1 ≈ Pr [B]+
δ + ε, the converse does not hold in general. No matter which additive bound
can be shown between two probabilistic events, there does not necessarily exist a
multiplicative bound. In particular, there are machines that are δ-indistinguishable
for some δ but not (ε, δ′)-indistinguishable for any ε such that δ′ < δ. We refer
to Appendix A.3 for a formal counterexample.
For secrecy properties, traditional indistinguishability intuitively states that
no adversary can learn any information about the secret, except with negligible
probability. The multiplicative factor generalizes indistinguishability to addition-
ally allow the adversary to learn information about the secret with more than
a negligible probability, as long as the loss of secrecy is bounded; e.g., if ε is a
small constant, then differential indistinguishability ensures that the owner of
the secret retains deniability by introducing doubt for the adversary.
Besides differential privacy, a multiplicative factor has also been used to
achieve a specialized relaxation of semantic security in the presence of efficient
adversaries that may tamper with an SV source [1, App B.4], and additionally
for a security analysis of anonymous communication protocols [2].
Example. Let us assume that Alice participates in an e-voting protocol based
on, e.g., a commitment scheme. If the random source that she uses to seed
her PRG turns out to be an (α, β)-bounded weak source, the commitments are
still ε-differentially hiding (see Appendix C.1 for a formal definition), where
ε = α + β is a small constant. Assume that Alice can vote for one of two
popular candidates, say, Bob and Charlie, and she chooses to vote for Bob. In
the traditional indistinguishability case, a non-negligible additive difference in
the guarantee could result from a non-negligible probability of leaking the vote,
which is highly unsatisfactory. The multiplicative factor 2ε, however, allows us
to guarantee that both cases will still maintain non-zero probability and no
distinguisher can be sure whether Alice voted for Bob or for Charlie. Consider a
distinguisher that only outputs, say ‘1’ if it is certain that the vote was cast for
Bob, and ‘0’ in all other cases. Such a distinguisher is affected by the multiplicative
bound as the output ‘1’ is almost equally probable in all cases. Moreover, if the
probability of outputting ‘1’ is zero when the vote was cast for Charlie, then
differential indistinguishability implies that the probability of outputting ‘1’ is
zero when the vote was cast for Bob.
Notice that the same analysis applies if a negligible additive value δ 6= 0 is
present. In this case, there might be a negligible chance for the adversary to be
certain about the vote, but in all other cases, deniability is preserved.
5.2 Influence of Min- and Max-Entropy
The literature on imperfect randomness has focused on “weak (entropy) sources”
(called α-weak sources in this paper), because a non-trivial amount of min-
entropy suffices for many applications. It is known to be sufficient to achieve
unpredictability-based definitions, i.e., security notions in which the adversary
has to guess a whole bitstring, e.g., the binding property of commitments and
unforgeability of signatures and message authentication codes [13,15,29] (see also
Appendix B).
Recently, Dodis and Yu [18] have extended this result significantly by showing
that if such an unpredictability game can be considered a part of an indistin-
guishability game (e.g., for an encryption scheme with a weakly generated key)
and if a simulatability condition proposed by the authors holds, then min-entropy
also suffices for the indistinguishability game. In particular, they consider a prim-
itive that can be divided into a setup phase (generating setup elements such as a
key pair) and a simulatable (i.e., stateless and repeatable) indistinguishability
game phase. They show that indistinguishability for such a primitive that can
be preserved despite the setup phase (but not the game phase!) employing an
α-weak source instead of uniform randomness. Here, the security notion under
consideration is indeed divided. The setup phase has some, usually not explicitly
specified, unpredictability notion (e.g., no adversary must be able to guess a cor-
rect key), and a corresponding game. Nevertheless, due to the impossibility result
by Dodis et al. [15], whenever only min-entropy is ensured, a secrecy guarantee
cannot be achieved in general, but only for certain schemes and under certain
conditions. We discuss this in detail for public-key encryption in Section 4.1.
If, however, the randomness source has additionally a bounded max-entropy
(and thus, among other properties, a full support), generic results are possible.
In particular, a differential secrecy guarantee is still possible for a secrecy notion
that is not simulatable (as defined by Dodis and Yu [18]), when an (α, β)-bounded
weak source is used for generating the key. More importantly, such a differential
guarantee is achievable when bounded weak randomness is used by the encryption
algorithm itself.
Interestingly, max-entropy on its own is not sufficient for giving meaningful
guarantees. If only the max-entropy of a source is bounded, the source could
still output one individual element with a very high probability such that the
probability over the other elements is evenly distributed. Therefore, we require
both min-entropy and max-entropy measures for giving reasonable quantitative
guarantees in all cases for which none of the specialized (e.g., unpredictability-
based) solutions is applicable.
5.3 Relation to Differential Privacy and Sensitivity
Differential privacy [19] quantifies the privacy provided by database query mech-
anisms: Intuitively, differential privacy requires that the output of a query mech-
anism should not allow to distinguish similar databases better than with a small
multiplicative factor. Both in terms of the definition and in terms of the small but
usually non-negligible multiplicative factor, differential privacy and differential
indistinguishability are closely related. We find this relation to be helpful for
interpreting the guarantees and for understanding the drawbacks of differential
indistinguishability. Differential privacy is influenced by the sensitivity of a sta-
tistical query, i.e., the amount of influence individual database records can have
on the output of the query. Typical differential private mechanisms sanitize their
output by adding random noise to guarantee a certain ε-level of privacy; the
amount of added noise directly depends on the sensitivity.
Although there are neither databases nor the concept of utility (in the same
sense as in differential privacy) in our setting, the fact that a bounded weak
source is differentially indistinguishable from a uniform source is analogous to the
differential privacy of a query mechanism. From this point of view, the missing
entropy of the weak source corresponds to the sensitivity in differential privacy.
This relation between sensitivity and entropy is interesting for sources that
can be analyzed in a block-by-block manner, e.g., (n, γ)-SV sources. For such
a source the entropy loss and thus the “sensitivity” is directly associated with
the parameter γ and the amount of blocks that are drawn from this source. The
higher the sensitivity, i.e., the more randomness is drawn by honest parties, the
smaller γ must be to allow for guaranteeing ε-differential indistinguishability for
a given value of ε. Clearly, the bias and thus the entropy loss in a (1, γ)-SV source
can be arbitrarily increased, e.g., by drawing more random bits and taking the
majority vote over them. Although this amplification does not make a difference
for uniform randomness, it may increase the bias of the bits for SV sources.
Therefore, for SV sources, the amount of randomness is a necessary parameter
that influences the security.
6 Related Work
The effect of imperfect randomness on traditional cryptography is well-studied.
On the negative side, several papers demonstrate the inherent limitations of
indistinguishability-based cryptographic guarantees with imperfect random-
ness [1,7,15,16]. Remarkably, Dodis et al. [15] show that traditional indistinguisha-
bility required for encryption, commitments, secret sharing, and zero-knowledge
cannot be realized if a bounded weak source is used, which constitutes the main
motivation for our work. More precisely, they prove that no protocol for any
of these primitives can be secure against certain block sources, which include
bounded weak sources. These sources sample blocks (i.e., several bits at once)
that are 1/poly(k) close to the uniform distribution [11,15,33] for an arbitrary
polynomial, where k is the security parameter.
This impossibility result has been refined and generalized over the last few
years. Bosley and Dodis [7] show that information-theoretically secure encryption
of more than log(n) bits is possible only if more than log(n) almost-uniform bits
can be extracted from the source in the first place. In the universal composability
(UC) setting [9], Canetti, Pass, and Shelat [10] show that even for (sampleable)
sources for which a deterministic extractor exists, UC-secure commitments are
not possible. Austrin et. al. [1] refined the impossibility result by Dodis et.
al. [15] to show that it holds even when the adversary that tampers with the
SV source is required to be efficient. Recently, Dodis and Yao [17] proposed a
novel classification of random sources that groups them into “separable” and
“expressive” sources. They apply their notions to rule out even one-bit encryption,
commitment, and zero-knowledge proofs for many weak sources.
On the positive side, one line of research examines the extraction of (almost)
perfect randomness from several kinds of imperfect randomness sources [6, 11, 12,
27, 34, 35]. However, extraction generally requires the source to have a certain
degree of independence, whereas the only main requirement for bounded weak
sources is to provide some entropy.
Aiming at particular applications, it has been shown that a few primitives can
be securely instantiated even if only imperfect randomness is available [1, 14, 26],
e.g., signatures [15] and Byzantine agreement [23].
Dodis et al. [14] prove that differential privacy of statistical queries can be
preserved even when the noise is generated using an imperfect random source.
In particular, they ask whether differential privacy is possible if no uniform
randomness is available, and give a positive answer for SV sources by presenting
a γ-differentially private algorithm that works on these sources. Relevant to our
observations, they note that traditional indistinguishability-based privacy is a
stronger notion as compared to, e.g., unforgeability.
A multiplicative factor as in this work has also been used to achieve a
specialized relaxation of semantic security in the presence of efficient adversaries
that may tamper with an SV source [1, App. B.4]. Moreover, such a factor has
proven useful for a security analysis of anonymous communication protocols [2,3].
Most closely related to our work, Dodis and Yu [18] show that for all
unpredictability-based primitives as well as for a class of restricted indistin-
guishability-based primitives, randomness sources with high min-entropy suffice
to guarantee security whenever a uniform random source already guarantees
security. While this is related to our result for unpredictability-based primitives
(Corollary 3), Dodis and Yu establish a traditional indistinguishability guarantee
(i.e., ε = 0) for a restricted class of indistinguishability-based primitives under
weaker assumptions on the randomness source, clearly surpassing our results in
these cases. However, the imposed gray-box requirements on indistinguishability
games rule out many common and interesting cases. In particular, their analysis
applies only to scenarios in which imperfect randomness is used at the beginning
of a game, i.e., typically as input to a key generation algorithm. This leads to
the observation that, e.g., for encryption, their result is restricted to imperfectly
generated keys, and does not take care of the case where the encryption algorithm
has access only to imperfect randomness.6 In contrast, while our method provides
only a differential guarantee, it is capable of obliviously analyzing essentially
all indistinguishability games that make use of imperfect randomness, without
imposing restrictions on the usage of this imperfect randomness. We refer to
Section 5.2 for a more thorough analysis of our requirements on randomness and
the possible results.
Kamara and Katz [26] propose a notion of security for symmetric-key encryp-
tion that is able to cope with imperfect randomness. However, their notion applies
only if the challenge messages are encrypted using uniform randomness. While
we consider their approach orthogonal to ours, it turns out that a combination
with our approach is possible. In the public-key setting, Bellare et al. [5] define
and realize the notion of hedged public-key encryption, which provides secrecy
guarantees even in the case of randomness failures, as long as the encrypted
message has enough entropy.
7 Future Directions
Our work presents a novel view on the relation between weak randomness and
indistinguishability, and it naturally leads to many more interesting questions.
From a theoretical point of view, we can ask whether it can be used in more
scenarios such as for leakage-resilient cryptography [8, 21]. In particular, is it
possible to give differential guarantees in cases where the adversary learns more
than allowed by existing leakage-resilient schemes?
On the practical side, a natural next step is to apply our results to real
applications and to random sources that are used in practice: Can we use
entropy measurements of real randomness generators (both hardware generators
and software generators) together with differential indistinguishability to give
cryptographic guarantees?
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A Postponed Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2 (Public-Key Encryption)
Proof. Let E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme, let Appt be
the class of ppt machines, and let {Dn}n∈N be an (α, β)-bounded weak source.
6 We note that this restriction cannot be circumvented by storing enough imperfect
randomness at the beginning of the game in order to use it later during encryption.
This approach would require the challenger to remember what parts of the stored
randomness have already been used, which is implicitly excluded in [18]. We refer to
Section 4.1 for a discussion.
To simplify the notation we write P (b,r)k,z for simulating P
(b)
k,z and using r ∈ {0, 1}n
as the randomness for Enc. Let X0(1k, r) ··= P (0,r)k,z and X1 ··= P (1,r)k,z with the
modification that X0 and X1 additionally provide a decryption oracle (as defined
in Definition 5) to the adversary. Observe that by our definition of X0 and X1,
the following two statements hold:
(i) X0(1k, Un) and X1(1k, Un) are indistinguishable for the class Appt of adver-
saries if and only if E is IND-CCA.
(ii) X0(1k, Dn) and X1(1k, Dn) are (ε, δ)-differential indistinguishability for the
class Appt of adversaries if and only if E is (ε, δ)-DIF-IND-CCA for {Dn}n∈N.
Thus, the claim follows immediately from Theorem 1. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2 (General Composition)
Proof. Given any adversary A ∈ A, for sufficiently large k and every possible
output x of A, applying the definition of differential indistinguishability for X0
and X1 as well as X1 and X2 yields
Pr
[〈
A(1k)
∣∣X0(1k)〉 = x] ≤ 2ε Pr [〈A(1k)∣∣X1(1k)〉 = x]+ δ
≤ 2ε(2ε′ Pr [〈A(1k∣∣X2(1k)〉 = x]+ δ′) + δ
≤ 2ε+ε′ Pr [〈A(1k)∣∣X2(1k)〉 = x]+ 2ε′δ + 2εδ′.
Symmetrically, we obtain the opposite bound
Pr
[〈
A(1k)
∣∣X2(1k)〉 = x] ≤ 2ε′+ε Pr [〈A(1k)∣∣X0(1k)〉 = x]+ 2εδ′ + 2ε′δ. uunionsq
A.3 On Additive and Multiplicative Bounds (Section 5.1)
Given any arbitrary function δ with 1 ≥ δk > 0, we construct a commitment
scheme C such that for every adversary there is an additive bound of δ (C is δ-
hiding), but there is no pair (ε, δ′) with δ′k < δk (for sufficiently large k) such that
C is (ε, δ′)-differentially hiding. No matter which additive bound can be shown
between two probabilistic events, there does not necessarily exist a non-trivial
multiplicative bound, i.e., a multiplicative bound that could be used to improve
on the additive bound.
Proof. Let CIT be an information-theoretically hiding commitment scheme. We
construct C = (S,R) from CIT as follows. For security parameter k, C behaves
like CIT but with probability δk, the algorithm S additionally leaks the message.
Clearly the scheme is δ-hiding. Consider the distinguisher A that sends two
messages m0,m1 to the challenger for the hiding game. Only if S leaks m0, A
outputs 0. In all other cases, A outputs 1. Let ε ≥ 0 and δ be functions with
δ′k < δk for sufficiently large k. For such k,
Pr
[〈
A(1k)
∣∣S(1k,m0)〉 = 0] = δ > δ′ = 2ε 0 + δ′
= 2ε Pr
[〈
A(1k)
∣∣S(1k,m1)〉 = 0]+ δ′.
Consequently, C is not (ε, δ′)-differentially hiding. uunionsq
B Unpredictability
So far we only considered the effect of (bounded) weak randomness on cryp-
tographic indistinguishability notions. The security games for notions such as
the binding property of commitments, unforgeability of signatures and message
authentication codes, or guessing the key of an encryption scheme do not require
indistinguishability. Instead, the adversary typically has to predict a particular
bitstring, which should only be possible with negligible probability. It is well-
known that such unpredictability (or unbreakability) notions are achievable even
if an α-weak source is employed [13,15,18,29].
We further analyze how imperfect randomness influences the probability for
guessing a whole bitstring, e.g., for breaking the binding property of a commitment.
The corresponding security definitions typically require that no adversary has
more than a negligible chance to reach a certain bad event. We generalize the
intuition of breaking a scheme by dividing a game Z into two parts. The “normal
game” Z0 and a judge Z1 that decides whether or not a given string constitutes
a break of the scheme. Technically, the output of an adversary A in interaction
with Z0 is fed into Z1, which finally outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether
the adversary has won.
Definition 6 (Unpredictability). Let Z = (Z0,Z1) be a probabilistic machine
that may keep state. We say that Z is δ-unpredictable for a class A of adversaries
and for a distribution {Dn}n∈N, if for all A ∈ A and for sufficiently large k,
Pr
[
Z1
(〈
A(1k)
∣∣Z0(1k, Dn)〉) = 1] ≤ δ.
We show that for all games that can be described as a unpredictability game
and for which the probability to win is negligible under uniform randomness, the
probability is still negligible if an α-weak source is used. Similar to our comments
in Remark 2, we notice that min-entropy suffices for this result.
Corollary 3. If a probabilistic machine Z = (Z0,Z1) that may keep state is
δ-unpredictable for a class of probabilistic machines A and consumes at most n
bits of uniform randomness, then Z is (2αδ)-unpredictable for A for any α-weak
source {Dn}n∈N.
Proof. We reduce this corollary to Lemma 1 as follows: Let Z = (Z0,Z1) be a
probabilistic (not necessarily polynomially bounded) machine that may keep
state. Given any adversary A ∈ A, we construct a probabilistic machine B on
input r ∈ {0, 1}n as follows. B simulates the interaction between A and Z0(1k, r),
yields an output a and simulates Z1 on a. If Z0 keeps state for Z1, B also simulates
this behavior. It holds that
Pr
[
Z1(a) = 1
∣∣ a← 〈A(1k)∣∣Z0(1k, Dn)〉] (4)
= Pr
[
B(1k, Dn) = 1
] ≤ 2α Pr [B(1k, Un) = 1] (5)
= 2α Pr
[
Z1(a) = 1
∣∣ a← 〈A(1k)∣∣Z0(1k, Un)〉] ≤ 2α δ. (6)
Inequality (5) follows from Lemma 1 and inequality (6) holds by assumption. uunionsq
C Commitments and Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In addition to public-key encryption (see Section 4.1), we apply differential
indistinguishability to the hiding property of commitment schemes and the
zero-knowledge property of proof systems.
C.1 Commitments
A non-interactive commitment scheme C consists of a three algorithms Setup,
Commit, and Open. The Setup algorithm is run by a recipient and outputs public
parameters pp. A sender runs the Commit algorithm, which takes as input the
public parameters pp and a message m in the message space M. It outputs
a commitment com as well as opening information op. Correspondingly, the
recipient runs the Open algorithm that takes as input the public parameters pp,
the commitment com and the opening information op. It outputs the message m
that has been committed to, or ⊥ if op is not valid opening information for the
commitment com under the public parameters pp.
A commitment scheme is information-theoretically hiding if the recipient,
given only the public parameters pp and the commitment com, cannot determine
any information about the message m. We relax this notion to a general hiding
notion that allows for a multiplicative secrecy loss.
Definition 7 (ε-Differentially Hiding Commitment Scheme). A non-in-
teractive commitment scheme C = (Setup,Commit,Open) over a message spaceM
is information-theoretically ε-differentially hiding for a random source {Dn}n∈N,
if for all adversaries A ∈ A, for all pairs of messages m0,m1 ∈M of the same
length, and for all bitstrings pp (that represent public parameters),
Pr [A(Commit(pp,m0)) = 1] ≤ 2ε Pr [A(Commit(pp,m1)) = 1] .
For ε = 0 and a uniform random source this is a standard definition for
information-theoretically hiding commitments.
With the notion of differential hiding at hand, we can provide a quantitative
guarantee on the security of a information-theoretically hiding commitment
scheme if it is used with an (α, β)-bounded weak source.
Theorem 3. Let C = (Setup,Commit,Open) be a non-interactive commitment
scheme over a message space M that is information-theoretically hiding (i.e.,
0-hiding) as in Definition 7 in which Commit uses n bits of uniform randomness.
C is (α+ β)-differentially hiding if Commit uses an (α, β)-bounded weak source
{Dn}n∈N instead of a uniform source.
Proof. Let C = (Setup,Commit,Open) be an information-theoretically hiding
non-interactive commitment scheme over the message spaceM such that Commit
uses at most {0, 1}n random bits. Let {Dn}n∈N be an (α, β)-bounded weak source
and {Un}n∈N be the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. Furthermore, let A be the
set of all probabilistic (not necessarily polynomially bounded) machines.
We define the machines X0 and X1 as: Xb(1k, r) ··= receive pp and (m0,m1)
from A and output Commit(pp,mb) using r as randomness. Observe that by our
definition of X0 and X1, the following two statements hold:
(i) X0(1k, Un) and X1(1k, Un) are indistinguishable for the class A of adversaries
if and only if C is information-theoretically hiding.7
(ii) X0(1k, Dn) and X1(1k, Dn) are (ε, 0)-differential indistinguishability for the
class A of adversaries if and only if C is ε-differentially hiding for {Dn}n∈N.
Thus, the claim follows immediately from Theorem 1. uunionsq
Other Definitions and Multiple Commitments. Essentially the same anal-
ysis can be carried out for statistically hiding and computationally hiding com-
mitments with the difference that in the former case, we introduce an additive
negligible value δ on the right hand side of Definition 7, in the latter case we
further only consider ppt adversaries. Furthermore, a similar analysis is appli-
cable to interactive commitment schemes. Theorem 3 presents guarantees for
single commitments. However, if the adversary is ppt and if the bounded weak
randomness was only used to seed a PRG, then by using Corollary 2 instead of
Theorem 1 we can give a (computational) ε-differentially hiding guarantee for
polynomially many commitments for ε = α+ β.
Binding Property with Imperfect Randomness. Whenever Theorem 3 is
used to show a scheme to be ε-differentially hiding for an (α, β)-bounded weak
source, the binding property is preserved (with a constant factor of 2α), if the
receiver uses an (α, β)-bounded weak source, which is in line with the results by
Dodis and Yu [18]. The reason is that binding is an “unpredictability property”
as discussed in Appendix B.
C.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Our method also allows for relaxing traditional definitions based on the sim-
ulation paradigm, e.g., zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs. The relaxation applies to
the indistinguishability of real views and simulated views: An (ε, δ)-ZK proof
system is differentially secure in the sense that the output of a simulator is almost
indistinguishable, i.e., (ε, δ)-differential indistinguishability, from the output of
a verifier interacting with the real prover. In other words, a distinguisher with
access to the output of the verifier can have only a small multiplicative advan-
tage (quantified by ε) in guessing that an interaction with the real prover has
been taken place, i.e., that new knowledge could have been learned at all. For
sufficiently small values of ε, such a guess is not convincing at all. For a malicious
verifier, that means that everything that has been learned about the witness
could have been learned from the simulator with almost the same probability.
An interactive proof system P = (P,V) for an NP-language L is a pair of
ppt machines P and V that both run on the same input x ∈ L. The prover P gets
7 Since Definition 7 required the scheme to be secure for all values pp,m0,m1, the
values can also be chosen by the (unbounded) adversary A.
a witness w from the set W (x) of witnesses for x as additional input, whereas
the verifier V gets an auxiliary string z.
Definition 8 ((ε, δ)-Differential Zero-Knowledge8). A proof system P =
(P,V) is (ε, δ)-differentially zero-knowledge for a randomness source {Dn}n∈N if
for every ppt verifier machine V∗, there is a ppt machine S (the simulator) such
that the following distribution ensembles are (ε, δ)-differentially indistinguishable
in |x| for all ppt adversaries:
(i) {〈V∗(x, z)|P (x,w,Dn)〉}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ (i.e., the output of V∗ for arbitrary
w ∈W (x))
(ii) {S(x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
For ε = 0 and a negligible function δ, this is the definition of computational
ZK [22].
Theorem 4. Let P = (P,V) be any proof system that is computationally ZK
(i.e., (0, δ)-ZK for negligible δ) and requires the prover to use n bits of uniform
randomness. P is (α+ β, 2αδ)-differentially ZK if the prover P uses an (α, β)-
bounded weak randomness source {Dn}n∈N instead of a uniform randomness
source.
Proof. Let A be a machine in the class Appt of all probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaries. Further, let F be an arbitrary function that maps each security
parameter k to a triple (x,w, z) consisting of a statement x ∈ L with |x| = k, a
corresponding w ∈W (x), and a auxiliary string z.
We define machines X0(1k, r) and X1(1k, r) as follows: Both X0 and X1 use
F (1k) to generate a triple (x,w, z).9 X0(1k, r) runs 〈P(x,w; r)|V∗(x, z)〉 and sends
the output of V∗(x, z), whereas X1(1k, r) ignores r, runs S(x, z) and sends its
output. (Recall that the simulator has access to uniform randomness.)
Observe that X0 and X1 are (ε, δ)-differentially indistinguishable if and only
if P = (P,V) is (ε, δ)-zero-knowledge. In particular, the goal of the polynomi-
ally bounded adversary A is to distinguish between the machines X0 and X1,
which simulate {〈V∗(x, z)|P (x,w; r)〉}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ and {S(x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ , re-
spectively. Note that A has access to the statement x and the auxiliary string z,
because it can be contained in the output of V∗(x, z). Thus, Theorem 1 implies
the claim. uunionsq
Note that Theorem 4 includes ZK proofs of knowledge, because they do not differ
from proofs of existence in the ZK property (but only in the existence of an
extractor).
8 Note that this definition is distinct from ε-knowledge [20], which allows the probabil-
ities of the output bits of a distinguisher to be related by a non-negligible additive
value.
9 Note that F might not be computable. However, it can be verified that Theorem 1
as well as the underlying Lemma 1 hold even in the case that the adversary has to
distinguish between the outputs of general functions. We have chosen to present the
current formulation to stay consistent with common notions.
Soundness. The soundness property is preserved if the proof system uses a
weak source instead of uniform randomness, similar to the binding property of
commitments, which we discuss in Appendix C.1.
Randomness Source of the Simulator. Definition 8 assumes that the sim-
ulator has access to uniform randomness. The intuition behind the definition
of ZK is that everything that is generated from an interaction with the prover
could have been generated without any interaction, using the simulator. Under
the assumption that uniform randomness is available in general, but the prover
does not use it, the same intuition applies if we allow the simulator to access
uniform randomness.
Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Similarly, a differential relaxation
is also possible for the security definition of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
In particular, we consider the case that not only the prover uses a bounded weak
source but also the common random string (CRS) is generated by a bounded
weak source.
Definition 9 (Non-interactive (ε, δ)-Differential Zero-Knowledge). The
non-interactive proof system P = (P,V) is single-theorem adaptive (ε, δ)-dif-
ferential zero-knowledge for a randomness source {Dn}n∈N if there exists a
polynomially bounded simulator machine S = (S1,S2) such that for every func-
tion F (which is supposed to get the CRS σ and select a statement x and a
witness w ∈W (x) adaptively) the following two ensembles are (ε, δ)-differentially
indistinguishable.
(i) {(σ, F (σ), pi) | pi ← P(x,w; r), (x,w)← F (σ), (σ, r)← Dn}k∈N
(ii)
{
(σ, F (σ), pi)
∣∣ pi ← S2(x, s), (x,w)← F (σ), (σ, s)← S1(1k)}k∈N
Note that both the CRS σ and the randomness r used by the prover are drawn
from Dn. For the sake of simplicity, we consider an adaptive single-theorem
definition, i.e., the CRS can only be used once. Additionally, we do not consider
auxiliary input that is available to the adversary. It is straight-forward to extend
our results to a variant with auxiliary input as well as to the multi-theorem
setting. In the latter, the security guarantees decrease similar as described in
Section 4.2 if the prover (aside from the CRS) uses imperfect randomness.
Theorem 5. Let P = (P,V) be a single-theorem adaptive non-interactive proof
system that is δ-zero-knowledge if the prover and the generation of the CRS
together require at most n bits of uniform randomness. Then P is (α+ β, 2αδ)-
differential zero-knowledge, if an (α, β)-bounded weak source {Dn}n∈N is used
instead of a uniform source.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.
Note that Theorem 5 also covers the case that the sources of the prover
and of the trusted party that generates the CRS are independent because the
combination of sources can be considered as one single source.
D Approximate (α, β)-Bounded Weak Sources
In this section we give a definition for sources that are only statistically close to
bounded weak sources. To do so, we first introduce a relaxed variant of entropy,
which is in line with [24].
D.1 Approximate Definitions
Definition 10. Given a distribution D over the set X and another set Y ⊆ X,
we use the following approximate measures of entropy:
– The Y-min-entropy of D is Hmin(D) ··= miny∈Y − log Pr[D = y]);
– The Y-max-entropy of D is Hmax(D) ··= maxy∈Y − log Pr[D = y]).
Definition 11. A family of distributions {Dn}n∈N, each over the set {0, 1}n of
bitstrings of length n, is a δ-approximate (α, β)-bounded weak source, if for every
Dn, there is a set Y ⊆ {0, 1}n such that the following entropy requirements are
satisfied:
(i) Dn has Y -min-entropy at least n− α.
(ii) Dn has Y -max-entropy at most n+ β.
(iii) max(Pr [Dn /∈ Y ] ,Pr [Un /∈ Y ]) ≤ δ.
Using these approximate entropy measures, we can now define approximate
bounded weak sources, which are a slight generalization of balanced sources (with
bias at most d) from [24], in which α = β = log(1 + d) and where δ is a negligible
function.
D.2 Main Result for Approximate Bounded Weak Sources
We continue by adopting our main result for δ-approximate (α, β)-bounded weak
sources.
Theorem 6. If two probabilistic machines X0 and X1 are ∆-indistinguishable for
a class of probabilistic machines A and the family of uniform sources {Un}n∈N
over {0, 1}n, then X0 and X1 are also (α+ β, 2α(∆+ δ) + δ)-differentially indis-
tinguishable for A and any δ-approximate (α, β)-bounded weak source.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1.
Note that this result is also applicable for non-negligible δ; however, the
resulting guarantees are not applicable to most cryptographic secrecy notions, as
they would lead to a non-negligible additive factor.
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